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ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION
by Humboldt C. Mandell, Jr., Ph.D.
The strategic plan for NASA's new explora-
tion initiative begins:
On July 20, 1989, the President of the
United States committed the nation to a
major initiative to explore space. The
goal of this initiative is human explora-
tion of the Moon and Mars as soon as
possible within the constraints of nation-
at resources.
From several years of studying alterna-
tive strategies and debating the relative
merits of national investments in space
exploration has emerged a consensus;
i.e., that expanding human presence and
activity beyond Earth orbit is an appro-
priate and inevitable long term focus for
the nation's space program. 1
The plan states three strategic themes: incre-
mental, logical evolutionary development;
economic viability; and excellence in man-
agement. All of these intricately involve the
cost estimation process, and, as will be
shown, will be completely dependent upon
the engineering cost estimator for success.
The purpose here is to articulate the issues
associated with beginning this major new
government initiative, to show how NASA
intends to resolve them, and finally to dem-
onstrate the vital importance of a leadership
role by the cost estimation community.
The Demand for a New Management
Paradigm
The exploration program objective, as stated
in the NASA Strategic Plan, emphasizes ear-
ly accomplishments, but also recognizes that
the environment today is substantially dif-
ferent, and that whatever is done must be
done within the limits of realistic budgets.
This presents a double challenge to NASA,
where the length of a human mission space-
craft development program has approached a
decade. For a new era of space exploration to
begin at all, it is believed, early milestones
must be set which are challenging and at-
tractive to those who must provide program
resources (the National Space Council, OMB,
Congress), oversight bodies which have sent
strong signals that multibillion dollar explo-
ration programs requiring decades to reach
fruition are not in NASA's future. NASA
must therefore provide early, visible, worth-
while milestones in exploring space.
At the same time, costs must be reduced.
Generally, compressing a given task into a
much shorter period of time will greatly in-
crease the annual funding required. NASA
must find ways to compress and at the same
time lower annual funding requirements. Al-
ready, the experienced engineer/estimator
will begin to have concerns. Accomplishing
these challenges one at a time is difficult
enough, but to accomplish both at once is be-
yond the paradigm of conventional aerospace
program management, on which almost all of
our estimation methods are based.
Another example of the problems with the
conventional aerospace management para-
digm is illustrated by the case of the Space
Station program. That program struggled to
lower annual budgetary requirements by re-
ducing the mission content of the program;
but the more the program is modified, the
more changes are incurred, the higher the to-
tal program cost, and the more pressure on
annual budgets. Reducing content can
achieve the most significant cost savings be-
fore the program is started. Once underway,
content reductions often exacerbate an al-
ready bad cost situation.
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The situation is made even worse by the ab-
sence of good tools. Every cost model em-
ployed by the aerospace industry today (with
perhaps one or two exceptions) merely pre-
dicts the future based on the behavior of the
past. If, then, extrapolation of past behavior
will not produce the desired result, how can
cost models based on that behavior serve us
at all? NASA has learned that they cannot.
In fact, they can become the tools of those
who oppose new programs, to prove to the
Congress and the Administration that un-
dertaking of the grand new adventure is fol-
ly. Of course, the point would not have been
proven at all, but the perception of proof is at
least as powerful as proof itself. One can look
for situations of this nature to arise within
the next few years. The cost estimator, then,
can become the enemy of progress. Or, as will
be demonstrated, he or she can lead the way
to change.
Struggle as we will within this old paradigm,
we will not be able to resolve the dual chal-
lenges of lowering annual costs substantially
while significantly reducing program length.
Impossible. So, what can be done? Should
NASA simply go the President and admit de-
feat? To do that would probably doom what
remains of the human adventure in space,
and not only jeopardize future programs, but
raise the question of the continuation of cur-
rent programs as well.
When a problem cannot be resolved within
one paradigm, it is obviously necessary to
change to a new one. But before that new
paradigm is defined, a direction must be es-
tablished, and a model created for the new.
To change course without a new destination
would be equally disastrous. The research
done by NASA to identify that new model fol-
lows.
A Summary of the Cost Challenges
Facing Exploration
Much of the planning of any new venture in-
volves matching demands for resources with
the predicted supply. Within the old para-
digm, the supply of resources has often been
predicted only by estimating the demand. In
former times, this process has worked be-
cause the aerospace and defense industries
have generally received ample support from
the nation to create this norm.
However, the norm is today being threat-
ened. As each new human space venture
since the initial Apollo lunar landing has
been launched, the availability of resources
has become increasingly scarce. The Space
Shuttle, a program designed to lower the cost
of placing humans and cargo into space, de-
feated its own raison d'etre when it was
forced, for reasons of annual budget limits, to
eliminate its completely reusable booster,
and to limit the availability of on-board
autonomy which would have reduced the ex-
pense of ground control and checkout.
Similarly, Space Station Freedom was beset
from the outset with mission compromises
caused by annual budgetary limits, and be-
came a much less capable facility than was
originally conceived by NASA. Each year the
program suffered further and further content
reductions in an attempt to meet annual cost
constraints.
Today's situation has found the nation even
less able to pay for large, new manned space
programs than ever before in our spacefaring
history. But it has taken some time for this
realization to influence the program plan-
ning paradigm. For example, as recently as
1991, the Advisory Committee on the Future
of the U.S. Space Program was making rec-
ommendations to the NASA Administrator
which, while recognizing that there were
budgetary constraints, were predicated on
the availability of greatly increased NASA
budgets (seeFigure I).
As NASA began its studies of human explo-
ration missions under the old management
paradigm, the cost models employed pro-
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Figure 1. Budget Assumption of the Advisory Committee
on the Future of the U.5. Space Program
duced estimates such as those shown by the
middle curve of Figure 2. Overlaid with the
budget projections of the Advisory Commit-
tee on the Future of the U.S Space Program
(top curve, Figure 2), there seemed to be no
reason to doubt that exploration had a bright
future.
However, when better budgetary estimates
were made with econometric models and
with full understanding of the true likeli-
hood of NASA budget growth (lower curve of
Figure 2), the dilemma became apparent to
some for the first time.
Four Things Which Must Be Done
To resolve the dilemma of budget growth,
NASA must do four things. First, full atten-
tion must be paid to the mission statement of
the opening paragraph: "to the Moon and to
Mars as soon as possible, within the con-
straints of national resources." With a focus
on the purpose of human exploration, the
need for much of the content of previous
planning exercises can be questioned, and
missions constructed which contain only
mission-related items.
Second, existing NASA and other govern-
mental resources must be found and lever-
aged. For example, much of the money cur-
rently being spent by NASA on science and
technology is fully applicable to the purposes
of human exploration; however, some mis-
sion focus must also occur in these areas. The
use of other federal resources can include the
use of national laboratories and DoD assets,
and these are being investigated.
Third, NASA must implement a new man-
agement paradigm which does things faster,
smaller, and less expensively, using the
enormous cost leverage which results from
cultural change.
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Figure 2. Comparison of
And finally, some new resources must un-
doubtedly be found for NASA. These will be
much more likely to be forthcoming if the
Agency once again gains the full confidence
of the Congress and other oversight groups
by demonstrating competence and efficien-
cies associated with the change to the new
management paradigm.
Benchmarks for the New Paradigm
NASA is conducting research to identify
benchmarks, guidelines, and processes for
the low cost, short schedule paradigm. Ex-
tensive interviews have been conducted and
analyses performed to identify high technol-
ogy programs which have been done under
different management norms, and which
have resulted in high performance, low cost,
quickly developed products.
Results of the interviews, summarized in
Figure 3, indicate a wide consensus on the
Budget Availability Models
part of those successful managers inter-
viewed, that NASA should confine itself
more to the development of good, perfor-
mance-based requirements, and establish a
more arms-length relationship with the pri-
vate sectorto allow the power of the competi-
tive marketplace to produce excellent pro-
ducts.
Historically,the highly interactive relation-
ships between NASA and its contractors
have produced excellent products, but pro-
gram change rates have been in the thou-
sands per year, and high costs and long de-
velopment schedules are typical.Contractor
awards should be based on the performance
of products as demonstrated in mission per-
formance. Taken altogether, the findings of
this research, as summarized, provide very
useful benchmarks for designing future pro-
gram management processes. But do these
findings describe a feasibleset ofconditions?
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Another part of the NASA research has dealt
with the identification of programs which
have been accomplished more under the de-
scribed new set of conditions than under the
existing aerospace paradigm. Programs like
the XR-71, the F-117, and the YF-16 (Lock-
heed, Lockheed, and General Dynamics, re-
spectively) have demonstrated that high
technology programs can be done very quick-
ly (all of these programs produced flying air-
craft in approximately two years) and at
costs significantly below those which would
have resulted from the old paradigm.
However, much more work is needed by the
industry to plan and execute an orderly tran-
sition from one culture, one paradigm, to the
new paradigm for NASA space exploration.
The cost estimator can play a key role in the
process.
Cost and Culture: The New Calculus
of Cost Analysis
Cost estimation methods employed by the
aerospace industry for program planning are
usually parametric in nature, although some
detailed estimating is used for special pur-
poses which do not readily lend themselves to
performance or size-based parametrics.
In most parametric estimation, for reasons
that parametric estimators seek the best pos-
sible analogies from their historical data-
bases, the implicit assumption is that a new
program will be a product of basically the
same cultural and management conditions
(the same paradigm) as programs of the re-
cent past. However, when this assumption is
made for exploration programs, the resulting
estimates exceed realisticbudgetary expec-
tations.
The ingredients of successful low-cost, high technology programs are well known
and universally recommended by successful program managers interviewed
- Use government only todefine requirements
- Keep requirements fixed: once requirements are stated, only relax them; never
add new ones
- Place product responsibility in a competitive private sector
- Specify end results (performance) of products, not how to achieve the results
- Minimize government involvement (small program offices)
- insure that all technologies are proven prior to the end of competition
- Utilize the private sector reporting system: reduce or eliminate specific
government reports
- Don't start a program until cost estimates and budget availability match
- Minimize or eliminate government imposed changes
- Reduce development time: any program development can be accomplished in 3
to 4 years once uncertainties are resolved
- Force people off of development programs when development is complete
- Incentivize the contractor to keep costs low (as opposed to CPAF, CPFF of NASA)
- Use geographic proximity of contractor organizations when possible
- Use the major prime contractor as the integrating contractor
Figure 3. Benchmarking Lessons Learned from Interviewing Successful Program Managers
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Therefore, one must conclude that, if major
exploration programs are to be performed,
significant cultural change to a new para-
digm is an absolute necessity. However, ex-
cept for the G.E. PRICE series of models, the
aerospace industry cost estimator is not
equipped to deal quantitatively with cultural
change as an explicit variable using the ex-
isting tools and databases. It has, therefore,
been necessary to construct a new type of cost
model, which, instead of predicting costs
from "technical" and performance param-
eters, will predict the cultural levels required
to produce a given cost outcome.
Working with the then-RCA PRICE Systems
organization, NASA performed a study tode-
termine the effectsof various culturally im-
posed standards on costs.The study results2
demonstrated conclusively that, while there
is correlation between cost and such things
as government-imposed parts traceabilityre-
quirements, major differences stillexist in
program costs which can only be explained
by the organizational "manner of doing busi-
ness,"or culture ofthe developing agent.
These resultshave recently been repeated by
Kelley Cyr of NASA's Johnson Space Center
and employed in the development of a new
series of cost models. Figure 4, based on a
statisticalanalysis ofseveral hundred points
of data, portrays the quantified relationship
between costand development culture.
In the current environment, this type of cost
equation provides the needed utilityto relate
costs to program management and manufac-
turing culture. Particularly in government
aerospace product acquisitions, the highest
levels of product performance have been for
over a generation the objectof most develop-
ment effortsin the industry.This has created
a culture where program cost, while highly
Relative
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Figure 4. Effect of Development Organization Type on Program Development
and Production Cost
54
ESTIMATING THE COSTS OF HUMAN SPACE EXPLORATION
important, has not generally been treated as
a critical design parameter.
In this climate, it is not surprising that many
design engineers and program planners are
generally not well equipped to deal with cost
as an explicit parameter. Who, then, is avail-
able to provide the leadership which will be
so vital to the conversion of our industry to
lower cost, shorter schedule norms?
Who is closest to the necessary data? Who
has the best understanding of the dynamics
of engineering processes as they are influ-
enced by costs and schedules? Who (often)
has training in both engineering and busi-
ness practices? Who is most often the one
who bears a major responsibility for any ma-
jor cost reduction activity? It it proposed here
that there is no one better equipped than the
company cost estimator. The case can be
made that the cost estimator is best able to
provide answers to all of these questions.
In the case of the exploration initiative, the
activities of the cost estimation team will
have the most significant influence of any on
the future success of the venture. That team
must not only develop compelling cost esti-
mates, but they must also lead the way in
providing the rationale, the supporting argu-
ments, to provide cogent reasons why NASA
can truly accomplish what it proposes (such
as returning humans to the Moon by 1999)
within the available budgets. It is also the
cost estimation team who must provide the
information for the design teams to utilize in
developing requirements for low-cost, early
missions. They may be the only team who
can complete the bridge to the new para-
digm. If they fail at this, the entire venture
will probably fail to be accepted by the Con-
gress and the Administration.
The aerospace industry cost estimating com-
munity holds the future of the United States
Space program in its hands. While this com-
munity is not unto itself sufficient to develop
the new initiative, it is vitally necessary.
Conversely, the cost estimating community
is totally sufficient to prematurely end the
life of American space exploration, at least
for this generation. It is far easier to develop
strong arguments for why the nation cannot
afford to send humans to the Moon and to
Mars than it is to prove that it cannot afford
not to do it. It is far more comfortable to fall
back on that which has served us well in the
past and hold to the old culture, to stay with
the old paradigm. It is far easier to use our
existing, culturally-bound costing methods
than it is to seek methods which can point
the way to changes that may brighten the fu-
ture of our entire profession, if not our indus-
try.
The job of cost estimators has never been
easy. The results of their work have often de-
termined whether or not their company wins
or loses a major competition. But today, it is
the cost estimators who wield the enormous
power of life or death over the future of the
United States space exploration program. It
is earnestly hoped that this awesome respon-
sibility will not be taken lightly.
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